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Review of Steen Brock: Niels Bohr’s Philosophy of Quantum 
Physics in the Light of the Helmholtzian Tradition of Theoretical 
Physics, Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2003, 303 pp.
This book originated from the revised version of a doctoral thesis at the Faculty 
of Arts of the University of Aarhus, Denmark. Its author is assoc. professor at 
the Aarhus Department of Philosophy, who specializes in Kierkegaard, Neo-
Wittgen steinian philosophy and German idealism.
Given the plethora of books on Niels Bohr’s philosophy of physics,1 the 
reader will immediately ask him- (or her-self) whether we really need yet 
another such study. But we must remember that so far no agreement has 
been reached on how to interpret Bohr’s position and where to place him 
among the various philosophical schools. He has been claimed by realists and 
antirealists,  pragmatists and idealists alike, by ordinary language philo sophy 
and transcendental philosophy, and so on, with each party being able to 
show some fi tting quotes seemingly in support of their appropriation. The 
in fl uen ces of some thinkers, especially Poul Martin Møller, Søren Kierkegaard 
and William James has already been pointed out by Max Jammer as early 
1 For a survey of the literature cf., e.g., my summaries of books on Bohr in Reader’s Guide to 
History of Science, ed. Arne Hessenbruch (London: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2000), pp. 92–94, many 
of which (such as Honner and Folse) have also been summarized by Steen Brock in various 
sections of the book under review.
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as 1966, later supplanted by further candidates such as Harald Høffding 
(most strongly argued  by Jan Faye, and equally bitterly disputed by David 
Favrholt). The book under review adds some more names to this very mixed 
bag, including Immanuel Kant, Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Ernst Cassirer, the 
Romantic tradi tion, Wittgenstein, and last but not least, Michael Dummett’s 
recent linguistic philosophy (discussed in chapter 4). If this wild assortment 
sounds implausible, here is what Brock himself claims: “I will present Bohr 
as a philosopher that insisted, perhaps unsuccessfully, on associating a post-
Kantian, neo-Romantic position with a full-blooded version of scientifi c 
realism.” (p. 10)
To be more precise, Brock tries to situate Bohr’s mature philosophy of 
quantum physics in what he calls the Helmholtzian tradition of theoretical 
physics which, in turn, harks back to Kantian roots. In following this program, 
Brock starts chapter 1 with a review of “the semantics of Kant’s transcendental 
analysis and its implications for Natural Philosophy.” Whether this was a good 
move in terms of the book’s readability is questionable though I did appreciate 
the effort to illustrate Kant’s table of judgement by means of Euler-diagrams 
which might also be the way to clarify the still often-discussed issue of the 
completeness of this table. Next follows his summary of the Helmholtzian 
tradition into which Brock rightly includes Max Planck, who indeed remained 
a (neo)Kantian throughout his active career. I would also go along with the 
claim that the label ‘classical physics’ is in fact a relatively late construct, 
formed not before 1870 and thus actually more or less parallels the emergence 
of the ‘modern’ physics against which it contrasts itself. It is slightly more 
strange to see the principle of least action (over?)interpreted as one of Kant’s 
transcendental principles of human under standing (pp. 58ff.). Helmholtz’s and 
Planck’s ideal of unifying the sciences (pp. 85ff.) is much more a case in point. 
I am also much less prepared than Brock to continue this train of thought to 
thinkers such as Heisenberg and Bohr which, after all, is the very point this 
books tries to make in chapter 3.
The way I read Hei senberg’s treatise on the uncertainty relations or his Chicago 
lectures is much closer to instrumentalism and phe no me na lism, inspired by 
Heisenberg’s reading of Mach and his creative misreading of Einstein (about 
which he speaks in Der Teil und das Ganze, for instance). If anything, it was 
Plato and not Kant who instilled some idealism into Heisenberg’s philosophy 
of science, whereas with Bohr I see neither Plato nor Kant. I am glad it was 
not a German philosopher who made this claim about Kant’s impact on Bohr, 
as this would easily have been ridiculed as yet another late attempt to restore 
the kind of intellectual hegemony that Kantianism had among German school-
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philosophers in the late 19th century. If there are any German roots in Bohr’s 
thought, they might rather be the Romantic Naturphilosophen and Høffding’s 
twisted version of Kantianism. Strangely enough, none of these really get 
much attention in the book: the fi rst group’s infl uence is more or less taken for 
granted (Brock only refers back to a study by Don Howard allegedly proving 
this point which however is still very contentious). The second issue is more 
or less dismissed (not a single book by Høffding is listed in the bib liography, 
for instance). Nor is it true that “Einstein was always a kind of neo-Kantian” 
as Brock claims on p. 140. To the contrary, Einstein refuted the Kantian move 
at its core in one of his unknown book reviews, which I rediscovered in 1987.2 
Of course, one can always call virtually everything dealing with the conditions 
of knowing a Kantian Gedankenfi gur, but this would infl ationarily subsume 
practically all forms of epistemology as a branch of Kantianism and – in my 
opinion – is not helpful in a history of philosophical thought.
Unfortunately, the author does exactly this when he writes, for instance: 
“As was the case with Heisenberg, Bohr certainly subscribes to this Kantian 
principle of causality as ‘a statement about measurements, laws and principles 
that says that all these can be so related that from this combination follows 
a system of knowledge and not a mere aggregate of observations’.” (p. 172, 
similarly on p. 200). This is no water-proof argument for Heisenberg and Bohr 
being Kantians of some sort, but a catch-all reading that makes practically all 
scientists of the turn of the century into Kantians, i.e., it simply broadens the 
category far too much. I also miss a lot more refl ection on what it means to 
trace the ‘infl uence’ of person A on to person B and under which conditions 
such a claim becomes feasible, testable and, horribile dictu, ultimately also 
falsifi able.
One of the more interesting claims of the book is, I think, Brock’s comparison 
of Bohr’s thought with some of Wittgenstein’s points. Indeed, Bohr’s obsession 
with language as the medium in which you have to express your thought in 
order to be comprehensible to others parallels Wittgenstein’s thoughts about 
language (cf., p. 203). Perhaps the switch from ‘classical’ to modern physics 
can be seen as a change of the language-game, with radically new rules for 
how to use expressions such as length, time, and measurement. But then the 
switch already sets in with Einstein, and Bohr just marks another step in this 
deep transformation of physical thought.
2 Klaus Hentschel, ‘Einstein, Neokantianismus und Theorienholismus’. Kantstudien, 78 (1987): 
459–470.
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Bohr’s philosophy also parallels Wittgenstein’s in so far as both thinkers are 
strangely unsystematic and hard – if not impossible – to systematize: hence both 
have created this avalanche of interpreters, all convinced that they have got it 
right and yet, each only capturing a small part of what Bohr, or Wittgenstein, 
had in mind. But I fi nd far too little to substantiate this claim in the book under 
review whose main focus is on Kantianism and the Helmholtzian tradition. This 
would have been fi ne if the idea was to explore, say, Planck’s philosophy of 
quantum theory or von Laue’s, but I simply don’t think it works for Bohr’s (or 
Heisenberg’s or Schrödinger’s). In private conversation, the author explained 
to me that his real intention was not to rephrase Bohr’s thought, but to show 
“how Bohr helped to transform an agenda” and thus initiated a drift away from 
‘Kantianism’, but I don’t think this aim becomes clear in the book itself which 
is all too easily read as another attempt at relocating Bohr.
Altogether, I must say that I found the book very hard to read, as it is often 
not clear where the author is heading, and the sentence structure is often heavy, 
even though almost everything is grammatically correct.
The absence of a name index does not help to retrace passages on some of the 
less frequently named fi gures. Since this book will be indigestible for beginners 
and since I disagree with so many of the claims made by the author, I can only 
recommend this book for the occasional specialist in the intellectual history 
of modern physics who is interested in some of the specifi c claims mentioned 
above and wants to see the argument in greater detail. The others might do 
better to read Bohr himself and see whether they can make sense of it in terms 
of one coherent philosophy of quantum physics, or rather as an amalgam of 
some deep philosophische Brosamen.
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